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ABSTRACT

In this paper, I provide a specific channel through which financial development
helps economic growth: by reducing the incidence of crises and making them less severe.
To support this, I examine the various links among financial markets development,
financial crisis, and GDP growth rate. My empirical estimates, using cross-country data
from 1980 to 2007, show a statistically significant and economically relevant effect
among these variables: countries with better local financial markets can largely decrease
the frequency of occurrence of financial crisis, and that efficient banking systems can
alleviate the adverse impact of banking crisis on output lost for the long-run, while better
stock market can do it for the short-run.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODCUTION
Financial globalization has been the main trend of world economy since the
collapse of Bretton Woods System. While financial globalization has been associated
with high growth rates, increased investment, and a better ability to diversify risk in some
countries, a number of other countries have experienced economic volatility because of
significant financial crises over the same period. These developments have sparked a hot
debate on the benefits of financial globalization.
At the initial stage, literature from such debate mainly focused on the direct
relationship between financial globalization and economic output. The proponents of
financial liberalization, such as Quinn (1997); Fischer (1998); Kraay (1998); Summers
(2000); Donnell (2001); Edison, Klein, and Slok (2004), suggest the way in which
financial globalization can benefit a country: financial globalization offers the
opportunity to augment domestic savings, to relax borrowing constraints, to diversify
away country-specific risk, to increase the investment, and to take the advantage of
technology spillovers. Their opinions are based on the standard neoclassical framework
which opines that it would generate welfare gains for both industrial countries with rich
capital and developing countries with poor capital if capital could flow freely between
them.1 However, with the deepening of financial integration came a spate of currency and
banking crises since 1980s. A number of developed and developing countries have been
hit by several serious financial and economic crises. The merits of international financial
1

This is summarized by Kose, Prrasad, Rogoff and Wei (2006)

6
integration are also under forceful attack and doubt. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998),
Detragiache and Kunt (1998), and Glick and Hutchinson (2001), argue that financial
globalization can increase the propensity to financial crises.2 Bhagwati (1998), Rodrik
(1998), and Stiglitz (2002) argue that increasing capital account liberalization and
unfettered capital flows are the important keys causing global financial stability.
However, literature in this stage has several disadvantages. First, most of the
academic economists analyzed the effects of financial globalization just in a divided
way—either positive or negative—rather than in a unified way, leading to a partial or a
bias account on the effect of financial globalization. More importantly, although vast
empirical literature has shown that GDP of the group of more financially open economies
does grow at a more favorable rate than that of group of less financially open economies,
or that financial liberalization increases the output volatility, it does not provide strong
and robust evidence to establish the causal or direct relationship between globalization
and economic growth and volatility.3
Therefore, at new stage of literature on such subject, academic economists
develop an integrated framework to empirically quantify and contrast the positive and
negative effect of financial globalization on economic growth. They found that the
positive effect of financial globalization on growth by far outweighs the effect on
volatility for the long run. For example, Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2006)
contrast experience of Thailand and India to support this assertion. Their finding is that
“Although Thailand, a country with high financial liberalization, has experienced lending
booms and crises, while India, a country with low financial liberalization, has followed a
2
3

See Klein and Olivei (2006) for more detail.

This is concluded by Kose, Prrasad, Rogoff and Wei (2006), and they thus propose “threshold effect”
which I will discuss later.
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stable and save growth path, Thailand’s GDP per capital grew by 148% between 1980
and 2001, while India’s GDP per capita grew by only 99%”.
By reviewing the existing literature, Kose, Prrasad, Rogoff and Wei (2006)
concluded that there is no strong and robust evidence to establish the causal or direct
relationship between globalization and economic growth and volatility. They propose
“threshold effect”, including financial market development, institutional quality,
governance, macroeconomic policies, and trade integration, to argue that globalization
effects on domestic economy through the “threshold effect”. In other words, whether one
country could reap benefit from globalization depends on how well its “threshold effect”
is. Especially, more and more economists notice that the financial market development
plays a crucial role in economy growth under the financial globalization. Using crosscountry data between 1975and 1995, Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli (2003) show that the direct
relationship between FDI and economic growth is not significant in their model, but once
the financial market development, a interaction factor, is added into the model, the
relationship becomes highly significant. That is, “FDI alone plays an ambiguous role in
contributing to economic growth. However, countries with well-developed financial
markets gain significantly from FDI.”4 Levine, Loayza, and Beck (1999) use the
traditional cross-section, instrumental variable procedures and dynamic panel techniques
to argue that “the exogenous components of financial markets development are positively
associated with economic growth.” By analyzing the cross-border countries data over
period 1986 to 1995, Klein and Olivei (2006) also show that “countries with open capital
accounts over some part or all of these periods had a significantly greater increase in

4

The percentage of FDI to GDP can be simply viewed as the financial openness degree.
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financial markets development than countries with continuing capital account restrictions,
and, over the twenty-year period, the developed financial markets make them enjoy
greater economic growth.”
I conclude above: firstly, it is arbitrary to say that financial globalization can
directly make countries enjoy the economic growth, or to blame that financial
globalization is a hotbed of the financial crises. The effect of financial globalization on
economy is realized through mechanism of “threshold effect”, especially the local
financial markets development. Secondly, lots of existing literature just explored the role
of local financial markets development in contributing to economic growth in a direct
way. That is, it examines how a well-developed financial market helps a country to
realize long-run GDP growth rate increase under the financial globalization.
The goal of my paper is not to perform another test of the direct effect of local
financial market development on GDP growth rate. Instead, its main contribution is to
provide an indirect perspective: If I can certificate that well-developed local financial
markets can decrease the frequency of occurrence of financial crisis and alleviate the
negative impact if financial crises occur, then, it can indirectly reflect that the role of
local financial markets development is important in contributing to the economic growth.
(See figure 1)
The asymmetric information theory, contagion theory (I will show these two
theory in next chapter), and the paper of Joyce and Nabar(2008) provide motivation for
my work. Joyce and Nabar argue that “in the absence of a banking crisis, a sudden stop
event would not by itself have a significant on investment, which can alleviate the
negative effect of capital flows on the economic volatility and stabilize the economic
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growth for the long run.” The assumption their paper bases on is that a country with welldeveloped local financial markets can avoid the banking crisis under the “sudden stop”.
To support my point, I examine the various links among financial markets
development, financial crisis, and GDP grow rate. My empirical estimates, using crosscountry data from 1980 to 2007, show a statistically significant and economically
relevant effect among these variables: countries with better local financial markets
experience fewer financial crises, and that efficient banking systems can alleviate the
adverse impact of banking crisis on output loss for the long-run, while a better stock
market can do it for the short-run.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the underlying theory is reviewed in
chapter 2; empirical methodology is presented in chapter 3; data are described in chapter
4; regression results are discussed in chapter 5; and chapter 6 concludes.
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CHAPTER II

THEORICAL SUPPORT
My paper is going to examine whether well-developed financial markets can
reduce the incidence of financial crises and alleviate their adverse effect. Below is a brief
summary of several theories that show how local financial markets development works to
decrease the financial volatility.
Asymmetric Information Theory. Asymmetric Information Theory is provided
by Frederic S. Mishkin (1994, 1998) to describe the structure of the financial system and
explore the theory of financial instability. He argues that “one of the reasons that using
asymmetric information theory to understand the relationship between financial markets
and financial crises is so attractive, is that this theory is able to clearly explain the basic
facts about financial structure.”5
Asymmetric information, “a situation in which one party to a financial contract
has much less accurate information than other party”, has been the problem of our
economic activity. Specifically, asymmetric information will lead to both adverse
selection and moral hazard in financial system. Mishkin defines adverse selection as “a
problem that occurs before the transaction occurs when potential bad credit risks are the
ones who most actively seek out a loan.” He describes that the “parties who are the most
likely to produce an adverse outcome are most likely to be selected, which will make
loans be bad credit risks.” Thus, lenders may decide not to provide any loans even though
there are good credit risks in the market. In contrast, moral hazard is the problem that
occurs after the transaction takes place. Mishkin explains that “moral hazard occurs
5

For more detail, see “Preventing Financial Crises” by Mishkin 1994.
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because a borrower has incentives to invest in projects with high risk in which the
borrower does well if the project succeeds but the lender bears most of the loss if the
project fails.” Moreover, the borrower may not work hard, uses the funds personally, or
invests it into unprofitable projects. Thus, lenders would rather not make loans.
These problems impedes the efficient function of financial system to channel
funds to individuals or firms who have the most productive investment opportunities,
which will badly harm the investment and economic growth, and increase the financial
volatility. More severely, Mishkin argues that adverse selection and moral hazard
problems will become much worse when interest rate rise, uncertainty increases, bank
panics happen, and stock market declines.6 If so, financial crises will occur.
Charles Wyplosz (1998) also points out the important role of adverse selection
and moral hazard problems in leading to financial crises. He argues that “adverse
selection implies a drying out of the market when risk is perceived to rise, which in turn
my elicit dangerous behavior”--Financial crisis in Mexico in 1994 is a good case, and that
“moral hazard leads to a variety of market failures as well as inappropriate policies,
which lead to financial crises and aggravate their adverse effect.”
By the mainstream literature on banks, it is the asymmetric information problem
that the existence of banks is justified. Firstly, banking systems and other financial
intermediaries are experts at discriminating good from bad credit risks, and Mishkin
argues that “financial intermediaries just make private loans that are not traded. As a

6

Frederic S. Mishkin gives the explanation to this in his paper “
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result, investors are less able to free ride off financial intermediaries and bid up the prices
of the loans.”7
Secondly, banking systems, compared with other financial intermediaries, are
better in reducing asymmetric information by solving the moral hazard. Because,
Mishkin explains, “banks’ advantages in information collection activities are enhanced
by their ability to engage in long-term customer relationships and issue loans using lines
of credit arrangements. In addition their ability to scrutinize the checking account
balances of borrowers provides banks with an additional advantage in monitoring the
borrowers’ behavior.”
Thirdly, using collateral is another important method for banks to reduce the
adverse selection and moral hazard. If borrowers default on loans, the losses of lenders
can be compensated by taking title and sell the collateral. Similarly, a well-developed
stock market can prevent firms’ net worth from declining. The high net worth can also
reduce the lender’s losses, if a firm defaults on its debt payments due to the poor
investment.
In sum, the Asymmetric Information Theory suggests that efficient banking
systems and a better stock market can reduce adverse selection and moral hazard
problems, and hence reduce the incidence of financial crises and alleviate their adverse
effects.
External shocks, Local financial markets, and Investment. As I have discussed
above, local financial markets play an important role in discriminating good from bad

7

In order to reduce asymmetric information, some people are willing to pay for the information.
However, many other people not paying for information can still take advantage of information that others
have paid for, leading to the “free-rider problem”. This suggests that, unlike the financial intermediaries,
the private sale of information to solve adverse selection and moral hazard problems is so limited.
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credit risks and channel funds to individuals or firms to promote the domestic investment
by which they contribute to countries’ long run economic growth. Furthermore, it appears
to be a significant factor in using foreign direct investment (FDI) and preventing the
adverse effect of capital sudden stops under financial globalization. Much of the previous
empirical work focusing on the impact of FDI on economic growth, like Alfaro, Chanda,
Kalemli (2003, 2006), has shown the importance of well-developed financial
intermediaries in taking advantage of those positive externalities of FDI, such as
technology spillovers, productivity gains, managerial skills, and introduction of new
processes.
In this part, I would like to review the research of Joyce and Nabar (2008) to
show how well-developed financial intermediaries reduce negative externalities of FDI:
the channels through which well-developed financial markets can alleviate the adverse
effects of external crises, such as sudden stops, and of the financial crises caused by that
shock, on a country’s investment and long run economic growth.
The increasing role of FDI is the essential feature of financial integration. While
FDI offers opportunity to countries to promote their economic growth, it also brings
potential risk to countries’ economic volatility, especially to those countries who mainly
rely on FDI and whose local financial markets are fragile. When external shocks (sudden
stops) occur, Joyce and Nabar point out that there are “several channels through which
sudden stops could potentially inflict serious long run economic costs on the domestic
economy due to a fall in investment. Domestic investment may collapse following an
external crisis if the supply of foreign funds for domestic investment dries up.” Local
firms and industries may no longer have access to direct foreign funds since their creditworthiness declines. Because capital flowing to the local subsidiaries of multinational
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corporations declines, those corporations’ ability to make domestic investment is
impeded. If investment cannot recover quickly, countries’ long-run economic growth will
be affected adversely. Joyce and Nabar give an example of East Asian countries that
experienced the financial crisis in 1997. They find that because most of these countries’
investment did not bounce back soon, their output growth also fail to reach the pre-crisis
average level quickly.
Local financial markets play a crucial role in connecting external shock and
investment collapses. Joyce and Nabar argue that if a country’s financial markets are
fragile, banking sector crises will easily occur following the external crises. If so, “the
allocation of resources and investment could be potentially more severely affected while
the financial intermediaries clean up their balance sheets.” They point out that even if
there are no external crises happening, the banking sectors crises alone can destroy the
domestic investment. However, if the local financial markets are well-developed--in the
absence of a banking crisis--“a sudden stop event would not by itself have a significant
on investment, which can alleviate the negative effect of capital flows on the economic
volatility and stabilize the economic growth for the long run.”
Contagion Theory. Historical lessons tell us that financial crises are not limited
by borders. Within a short period after flotation of the Thai baht in July 2, 1997, the
financial crisis had spread to Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Philippines. Similarly,
Hong Kong, Brazil, Mexico, and many other countries were quickly affected by the
Russian crisis in 1998. The contagion theory is thus developed to describe and explain
such phenomenon. Contagion is classified into two broad types—fundamentals-based
contagion, used to describe shock that affect markets due to real and financial links and
including common shock, trade linkages, and financial linkage, and investor-based
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contagion, used to described the “process by which shocks that affect one market are
transmitted to related markets despite the lack of actual fundamental relationships
between the respective markets.” (Santor, 2002)
Common shocks, such as a rise in world interest rates, a sharp decline in world
aggregate demand, a large slowdown in commodity prices, or a significant change in
exchange rate, may induce pressures and adverse effect of crises on currencies or stock
markets of several countries simultaneously. Trade linkages can propagate currency crisis
from one country to another. For instance, “currency contagion starts by a real
depreciation of country A’s currency due to speculative attacks. Such depreciation
enhances its export competitiveness and produces a trade deficit for its competitor
country B. This result in a depletion of the foreign exchange reserves of country B and
thus increase the probability of speculative attacks on country B’s currency.”8 For the
financial linkages, Eric Santor (2002) argue that the negative effect of crises can be
transmitted by undermining the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio through credit exposer,
which leads to insolvency if credit risks are not well managed. Investor-based contagion
can be explained by asymmetric information theory: if a crisis occurs in one country and
generates fears of speculative attacks, it may induce financial markets’ participants to
reassess other countries’ fundamentals and investors may expect to profit from
speculation against currencies that they think other investors will also sell (Caramazza,
Ricci, and Salgado, 2000). The behavior of investors during these periods is called
“herding”. Since there exist imperfect information and collecting information is costly,
investors have to follow those whose actions are thought to be “correct”. Such “herding”
8

this example is cited from Eric Santor (2002)
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behavior would induce asset price falls in the affected countries, thus undermining banks’
balance sheets and spread the crises.
We can see that both types of contagion spread crises by affecting the local
financial markets—currency market, stock market, and money market, which suggest that
the local financial market condition plays a significant role in spreading crisis. Khalid and
Kawai (2002) argue that “a country with weak financial market fundamentals is more
likely to suffer from shocks elsewhere. Any speculative attack in another country will
make this country more vulnerable to similar attacks.” Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado
(2000), investigating the relevance of external, domestic, and financial weaknesses as
well as trade and financial linkages in inducing financial crises for 61 emerging markets
and industrial countries, find that once the domestic and external fundamentals and trade
spillovers are controlled, financial linkages and weaknesses play a significant role in
spreading crises. Thus we can expect that well-developed financial markets are necessary
for a country to avoid crises transmitted by other countries, and thus to reduce the
incidence of financial crises.
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CHAPTER III

EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
The purpose of my empirical analysis is to test: 1) whether well-developed
financial markets can reduce the incidence of financial crises; 2) whether, if financial
crises occur, well-developed financial markets can alleviate their adverse effects on
economic growth. The first test reflects the defense ability of local financial markets
against financial crises, while the second test indicates the adjustment ability of local
financial markets on the economies after financial crises occur. The reason I divide the
empirical analysis into two parts is that we have to recognize that no matter how well the
local financial markets development, it cannot totally eliminate the financial crises.
Although some industrial countries have a high level of financial markets development,
they also have suffered from financial crises, such as the examples of collapse of the
Japanese asset price bubble in 1980s, three Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden and
Finland) crisis in the late 1980s, and sub-prime mortgage crisis of U.S. in 2007.
For the first test, I use regression analysis to look at the direct effect of the level of
local financial markets development on incidence of financial crises. This regression
analysis uses data from 84 countries consisting of developed countries and emerging
markets from 1980 to 2007 (Years of a small group of countries begin from 1982 or 1983
because of absence of some data). The basic regression takes the form:
INCIDENCEi = β0 + β1FINANCEi + β2Xi + εi

(1)

Where, INCIDENCEi is the number of times of a financial crisis including currency
crisis, banking crisis, twin crisis, and debt crisis occurred in country i from 1980 to 2007,
FINANCEi indicates country i’s average level of its local financial markets development
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during this period (That is the variables of commercial-central bank assets, liquid liability
of financial system, private sector credit, and bank credit which I will explain in next
chapter.), Xi represents a vector of other control variables including average level of
Financial Openness, Trade Openness during this period, the ratio of Governments
Expense to GDP, as well as the GDP per capita and εi is an error term.
For the second test, I also use regression method to test the direct effect of the
level of local financial markets development on difference of GDP growth rate between
post-banking crisis and pre-banking crisis for occurred-year, short-term, and long-term.
The data are from 45 countries consisting of developed countries and emerging markets
from 1990 to 2004. The following equation is estimated:
Gr.Dec.i = β0 + β1FINANCEi + β2Xi + εi

(2)

Where Gr.Dec.i (GDP growth rate decline) is difference of country i’s GDP growth rate
between post-banking crisis and pre-banking crisis, which represents the impact of local
banking crisis on its output (Here, I just use the data after banking crisis rather than other
financial crises because, I have shown in last chapter, external or internal shock would
finally lead to banking system crisis if local financial markets cannot avoid such shock.
In addition, the change of GDP growth rate due to banking crisis can reflect more clearly
about the direct function of domestic financial intermediaries to alleviate adverse effects
on economic growth.), FINANCEi indicates country i’s level of its local financial
markets development before the banking crisis occurred (in this test, these variables not
only contain the bank-system variables-- bank assets, liquid liability of financial system,
private sector credit, and bank credit, but also the stock market variables— valued trade,
and capitalization, which I will explain in next chapter), Xi represents a vector of other
control variables including the level of country i’s Financial Openness, Trade Openness,

19
the ratio of Governments Expense to GDP, Inflation Rate, Control of Corruption,
Regulatory Ability, and Rule of Law before the banking crisis occurred, and εi is a mean
zero, constant variance disturbance term.
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CHAPTER IV

DATA
This chapter describes and explains the data used in the regression analysis. I
collect information about 5 variables for 84 countries from 1980 to 2007 for test 1, and
about 10 variables for 44countries from1990 to 2004 for test 2, including incidence of
financial crises, the change of GDP growth rate, the level of local financial markets
development, and some control variables.
Incidence, used as the dependent variable in test 1, represents the number of
times a financial crisis occurred in each of the 84 countries from 1980 to 2007. The data
are obtained from the IMF working paper of Laeven and Valencia (2008)—“Systemic
Banking Crises: A New Database”, which reports a latest database on the timing of
systemic financial crises including banking crisis, currency crisis, and sovereign debt9
crisis. The database covers 161 countries for the period 1970-2007. I just select 84
countries from it for the period 1980-2007 due to lack of other data of some countries and
before 1980.
Gr.Dec., the dependent variable in test 2, is the decline of a country’s growth of
real GDP per capita, due to a banking crisis; it measures the magnitude of the crisis. The
GDP growth rate data come from Penn World Table 6.210. I test the impact of banking
crisis on GDP growth rate change for three periods: the impact in occurred year—the
GDP growth rate of the year in which the banking crisis occurred minus the average of
9

In test 2, I get the data from the paper of Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)—“This Time Is Different”.
The Penn World Table “provides purchasing power parity and national income accounts converted to
international prices for 188 countries for some or all of the years 1950-2004. The European Union or the
OECD provides more detailed purchasing power and real product estimates for their countries and the
World Bank makes current price estimates for most PWT countries at the GDP level.”

10

21
three years GDP growth rate prior to the banking crisis (The later term represents the
level of GDP growth rate before the banking crisis occurred.), the short run impact—the
average of two years GDP growth rate after banking crisis occurred minus the average of
three years GDP growth rate prior to the banking crisis, and the long run impact—the
average of five years GDP growth rate after banking crisis occurred minus the average of
three years GDP growth rate prior to the banking crisis. In addition, the information of
banking crisis is obtained from the paper of Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)—“This Time Is
Different”.
Finance, the independent variable in both tests, is measured as the level of a
country’s local financial markets development, including monetary market (banking
system), and capital market (stock market)11—in test 1, it is the average of the level from
1980 to 2007; in test 2, it is the level prior to the banking crisis. The accurate and
comparable measures of level of the local financial markets development are very
difficult to construct. I draw on such variables introduced by King and Levine (1993a),
Levine and Zervos (1998), and Levine (2000). Alfaro et al. (2003) also follow these
existing literatures to measure financial markets development, they argue that these
variables can be classified into two broad categories: those concerning banking sector—
liquid liability of financial system (henceforth, LLY), commercial-central bank assets
(henceforth, BTOT), private sector credit (henceforth, PRIVCR), and bank credit
(henceforth, BANKCR), and those relating to stock market—valued trade (henceforth,
SVALT), and capitalization (henceforth, SCAPT). Levine et al. (2000) explain these
variables in their paper that they “would ideally like to construct measures of the ability
11

In test 1, I just use the data about local monetary market because lots of countries did not realize stock
market liberalization before 1990s.
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of different financial systems to research and identify profitable ventures, monitor and
control managers, ease risk management and facilitate resource mobilization. It is
impossible, however, to construct accurate, comparable measures of these financial
services.” Consequently, they use these indicators, but each of them, they argue, has
particular strengths and weakness.
I obtain these six indicators from World Bank Financial Structure Database
(2007)12. LLY: equals Liquid Liabilities (currency plus demand and interest-bearing
liabilities of bank and financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. It is the broadest
measure of the depth and size of financial intermediation, including central bank, deposit
money bank, and other financial institution. Levine et al. (2000) point out the
shortcomings of this variable. They assert that ‘it may not gauge the effectiveness of
financial sector in ameliorating information asymmetries and easing transactions costs.
Also, it includes deposits by one financial intermediary in another, which may involve
‘double counting’”. This may be the reason that LLY is not significantly associated with
the dependent variable in test 2, which is shown in next chapter. BTOT: equals the ratio
of commercial bank assets divided by commercial bank plus central bank assets. This
indicator measures the degree to which commercial banks allocate society’s saving.
However, Levine et al. (2000) point out that it is not a direct measure of the quality and
quantity of financial services provided by financial intermediaries, because “it does not
directly measure the effectiveness of bank in researching firms, exerting corporate control,
mobilizing saving, and easing transaction.” PRIVCR: equals the value of credit by
financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP. Levine et al. (2000) assert
that it is the best indicator among these variables “because it improves on other measures
12

The URL for the database is http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/database.htm.
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of financial development used in the literature”. They argue that “this measure of
financial development is more than a simple measure of financial sector size. It isolates
credit issued to private sector, as opposed to credit issued to governments and public
enterprises. Furthermore, it excludes credit issued by central bank”. This advantage
avoids the ‘double counting’ problem of LLY. Moreover, they also argue that PRIVCR
could, although not in a direct way, measure the amelioration information asymmetries.
BANKCR: equals private credit by deposit money banks divided by GDP. It is similar
with PRIVCR, but it does not include non-BANKCR to the private sector. Thus, it may
be not comprehensive for some countries. SVALT (it equals stock market total value
traded divided by GDP), and SCAPT (it equals stock market capitalization divided by
GDP) are indicators about the liquidity and size of stock market.
Control Variables. The regression result may be affected by some other factors,
such as the level of a country’s openness, government consumption, inflation rate, control
of corruption, government regulation and policy ability, and rule of law, which are
necessarily to be controlled in the tests.
Although existing literature does not provide strong and robust evidence to
establish the causal or direct relationship between globalization and economic growth and
volatility, it does not necessarily imply there is no connection between them. Vast
empirical literature has shown that financial crises of the group of more financially open
economies are more than that of group of less financially open economies. So, the level
of openness should be considered I consider two aspects of openness: the finance
openness and trade openness. Finance openness equals the sum of FDI inflow and
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outflow divided by GDP13. It may not be an accurate way to show the degree of finance
openness, but considering FDI accounts for the largest part of capital flows, it can be
simply viewed as the financial openness degree. The data for FDI flows are obtained
from United Nations’ “WIR Annex Table” (2008).14 Trade openness equals import plus
export and then divided by GDP. I collect the export and import data from Penn World
Table 6.2. Existing literature, such as Calvo et al. (2004) and Frankel et al. (2005), show
that trade openness can make countries less vulnerable to financial crises, and mitigate
the costs of such crises if they do occur.
I have shown in chapter 1 that it is the interaction between financial globalization
and “threshold effect” that determines growth and volatility. Besides the development of
local financial sectors, “threshold effect” also includes “improvements in institutions
(defined broadly to include governance, the rule of law etc.), and better macroeconomic
policies etc” (Kose, Prrasad, Rogoff and Wei 2006), which I should consider in the
regression analysis: Control of Corruption plays a great role in affecting a country’s
ability to attract and stabilize FDI flows by which a country can promote more domestic
investment, facilitate its economic growth and decrease the output volatility. The
corruption index in my tests comes from “Annual Report Transparency International”15;
Regulation ability is an important key for a country’s government to prevent the country
from crises under the financial integration. Kose et al. (2006) assert that premature
opening of finance poses risk to crises when financial regulation and supervision are

13

This method is introduced by Kose et al. (2006)
The most relevant time-series data from the WIR annex tables include selected FDI and cross-border
M&A data. The URL for the database is
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3277&lang=1
15
In test 2, this control variable represents the level of a country’s corruption which is prior to banking
crisis. Such data of those counties in which banking crisis occurred before 1995 are substituted by 1995’s
index, since the data are absent before 1995.
14
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inadequate. Financial integration can intensify the capital flows which are channeled by
excessive risks or weak fundamentals. In turns those premature capital inflows could
have adverse effect on the health of financial institution in the event of adverse shocks.
The data about government regulation and Rule of Law come from World Bank’s
“Governance Matters—Worldwide Governance Indicators” (2008)16
Other control variables are Government Expense of which data are from Penn
World Table 6.2, and Inflation rate of which data are obtained from IMF’s “World
Economic Outlook Database” (2008, Oct.)
Finally, I have to note that the data of control variables in test 1 are the average
value from 1980 to 2007, which give the outlook of these countries’ economy condition,
while in test 2, I get these data of the year prior to banking crisis year, which show the
local condition before banking crisis occurred.

16

The URL for the database is http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp
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CHAPTER V

REGRESSION RESULT
Test 1
Test 1, with the sample size of 84 countries from 1980 to 2007, examines whether
a well-developed local financial markets could decrease the incidence of financial crises
under financial integration. Table 1 (A,B,C,D) reports the results that, at 5% significance
level, all financial indicators (BTOT, LLY, BANKCR, and PRIVCR) turn out to be
negatively and significantly associated with the incidence of financial crises (including
banking crisis, currency crisis, and debt crisis). That is, the higher the level of a country’s
local financial markets development (especially the banking systems, since the stock
markets’ indicators are not counted in this test), the less the possibility of occurrence of
financial crises in that country. The impact is quantitatively important. For example, a
one standard deviation increase in PRIVCR could reduce a country’s incidence of
financial crises by 0.4%. This result confirms those theories I have shown in chapter 2: A
country with well developed local financial markets may decrease the incidence of
financial crises, because well developed local financial markets help the country alleviate
asymmetric information problem, reduce adverse selection and moral hazard, stand
against the external shock (sudden stop and reversal of capital flows), and decrease
probability of contagion due to financial crises occurred in other countries. Also, my
regression result could support the finding of Husain, Mody and Rogoff (2005). They
show that “emerging markets experience more banking or twin crises than do advanced
or developing economies.” They explain that emerging markets, for the one hand, are

27
more exposed to financial integration, but for the other hand they have much weaker
financial markets than advanced countries have.
Test 2
Since it is hard to completely prevent financial crises no matter how well a
country’s financial markets, test 2 examines whether a country with well-developed
financial sectors could alleviate the adverse effect of financial crises on economic growth
if crises occur.
Banking system. Table 2 (A-F) reports that a country’s GDP growth rate
decreases for the long run after a banking crisis occurred (five years after). Table 2-A
shows that, at 5% significance level, the PRIVCR indicator is negatively and significantly
associated with GDP growth rate lose, while other tables (table 2-B,C,D) show that LLY,
BTOT, and BANKCR are not. However, Levine et al. (2000) explain that each of those
variables has its own shortcoming to measure the financial sectors development. For
example, LLY “may not gauge the effectiveness of financial sector in ameliorating
information asymmetries and easing transactions costs. Also, it includes deposits by one
financial intermediary in another, which may involve ‘double counting’”. BTOT “is not a
direct measure of the quality and quantity of financial services provided by financial
intermediaries, because it does not directly measure the effectiveness of bank in
researching firms, exerting corporate control, mobilizing saving, and easing transaction.”
Compared with other financial sectors indicators, Levine et al. (2000) argue that PRIVCE
is the best, “because it improves on other measures of financial development used in the
literature”. They argue that “this measure of financial development is more than a simple
measure of financial sector size. It isolates credit issued to private sector, as opposed to
credit issued to governments and public enterprises. Furthermore, it excludes credit
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issued by central bank”. Thus, this result could still show that, for the long run, the higher
the level of a country’s banking systems development, the smaller the GDP growth rate
loss due to the banking crisis. Since investment plays an important role in countries’ long
run economic growth and well-developed banking system could reduce the adverse
impact of external shock and local banking crisis on investment, the result is
understandable and acceptable. To give a sense of the magnitude of the estimates, I make
table 6 to show the change in GDP growth rate decline for the long run when Private
sector credit (PRIVCR) changes by the difference between two countries’ PRIVCR. For
example, the difference between UK’s PRIVCR (1.1158) and Indonesia’s PRIVCR
(0.5120) is 0.6038, so the change in GDP growth rate decline for the long run for these
two countries is 0.6038* -3.337=-2.01. It indicates that Indonesia suffered 2.01% more
GDP growth rate decline during banking crisis than UK did due to their PRIVCR
difference. However, table 3, for the short run impact (two years after), and table 4, for
the impact of occurred year, report the results that all banking system indicators are not
very significantly associated with GDP growth rate lose. Joyce and Nabar (2008) may be
able to explain this result. They argue that GDP even could grow in the short run after
crises occurred because net exports rise due to a currency devaluation. Calvo and
Reinhart (2000), and Hutchison and Noy (2006) also point out that output could have a
quick recovery after financial crises due to the net export. Although not significant, table
3 and table 4 also indicate that the relationship between financial sectors variables and
GDP growth rate lose is negative. That is, a well-developed banking system more or less
could reduce the decline of GDP growth rate for the short run.
Stock market. Table 3-E,F show that stock market development is negatively and
significantly associated with GDP growth rate lose for the short run in aftermath of
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banking crisis, while table 2-E,F and table 4-E,F report that the relationship among them
is not significant for the long run as well as in occurred year. There are some probable
explanations for these results. Firstly, a well-developed stock market could decrease the
incidence of herding behavior and speculative bubbles when crises occurred, which could
delay the crises extension. Secondly, as shown in chapter 2, a well-developed stock
market can prevent firms’ net worth from declining. The high net worth can reduce the
lender’s losses, and hence prevent the domestic investment from declining sharply.
Thirdly, SVALT and SCAPT are indicators about the liquidity and size of stock market.
Levine and Zervos (1998) also find that stock market size is not robustly linked with long
run GDP growth rate.
In addition, for test 2, I also try to add the square of finance indicator on the right
hand side of equation 2. This will test if for very large financial markets relative to GDP
the crisis can actually be very bad (worse than for intermediate levels). This consideration
is motivated by the experience of Iceland during this crisis – their financial sector was
huge and when the crisis hit, it took the whole economy down with it. However, I finally
find that there does not seem to be a non-linear relationship. I will continue this study in
future.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION
This paper studied the empirical relationship between various measures of local
financial markets development and incidence of financial crises as well as GDP growth
rate loss in the aftermath of a banking crisis. I find that countries with better local
financial markets experience significantly fewer financial crises, and that efficient
banking systems can alleviate the adverse impact of a banking crisis on output lost for the
long-run, while better stock market can do it for the short-run. Basing on these results, I
provide a specific channel to show that well-developed local financial markets play an
important role in contributing to long-run economic growth under the financial
globalization.
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TABLES

Table 1-A: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on
incidence of financial crises — Liquid liability of financial system
(Significance At 5% Level; 84 Observations; R Square: 0.3469)

Intercept
Liquid liability of
financial system
FDI openness
Trade Openness
GOV.EX./GDP
GDP/CAPITA

Coefficients
4.7047

Standard
Error
0.5186

t Stat
9.0725

-2.7796
-0.0988
-0.0075
-0.0247
6.3654

0.5353
0.0932
0.0048
0.0190
9.4292

-5.1923
-1.0602
-1.5789
-1.2979
0.6751

Mean

0.4840
0.9304
67.7920
20.6233
602319.9

Table 1-B: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on
incidence of financial crises — Commercial-central bank assets
(Significance At 5% Level; 84 Observations; R Square: 0.3426)

Intercept
Commercialcentral bank assets
FDI openness
Trade Openness
GOV.EX./GDP
GDP/CAPITA

Coefficients
6.8463

Standard
Error
0.7854

t Stat
8.7159

-4.8701
-0.0563
-0.0015
-0.0303
1.1013

0.9502
0.0955
0.0051
0.0191
9.4967

-5.1252
-0.5902
-0.3034
-1.5815
1.1596

Mean

0.7891
0.9304
67.7920
20.6233
602319.9

Table 1-C: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on
incidence of financial crises — Bank credit
(Significance At 5% Level; 84 Observations; R Square: 0.4475)

Intercept

Bank credit
FDI openness
Trade Openness
GOV.EX./GDP
GDP/CAPITA

Coefficients
4.7204
-3.0428
-0.0623
-0.0066
-0.0364
8.5100

Standard
Error
0.4664
0.4483
0.0862
0.0043
0.0176
8.6800

t Stat
10.1189
-6.7864
-0.7231
-1.5133
-2.0622
0.9809

Mean
0.4032
0.9304
67.7920
20.6233
602319.9
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Table 1-D: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on
incidence of financial crises — Private sector credit
(Significance At 5% Level; 84 Observations; R Square: 0.4262)

Intercept
private sector
credit
FDI openness
Trade Openness
GOV.EX./GDP
GDP/CAPITA

Coefficients
4.7307

Standard
Error
0.4778

t Stat
9.9010

-2.6329
-0.0344
-0.0076
-0.0374
1.1900

0.4089
0.0892
0.0044
0.0180
8.8700

-6.4390
-0.3852
-1.6952
-2.0747
1.3457

Mean

0.4565
0.9304
67.7920
20.6233
602319.9
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Table 2-A: The long run effect of the level of local financial markets development on
GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Private sector credit (banking system)
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.3828)
Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

Intercept

-4.2491

2.3311

-1.8227

Private sector credit

-3.3379

1.5189

-2.1976

0.4607

GOV/GDP

0.0377

0.0707

0.5338

19.5002

FDI openness

0.8715

0.7323

1.1899

0.6015

Trade openness

0.0095

0.0107

0.8852

64.3827

Corruption

0.3411

0.4215

0.8092

3.9527

Inflation Rate

0.0379

0.0126

3.0086

22.7901

Regulation

0.4320

1.0163

0.4250

0.3134

RULE OF LAW

0.4826

1.0862

0.4443

0.0468

Table 2-B: The long run effect of the level of local financial markets development on
GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Liquid liability of financial system
(banking system)

(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.3078)
Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

Intercept

-4.8924

2.6983

-1.8131

Liquid liability of
financial system

-1.3477

1.8827

-0.7158

0.478817

GOV/GDP

0.0207

0.0754

0.2743

FDI openness
Trade openness

0.6675

0.7766

0.8594

0.0076

0.0114

0.6658

Corruption

0.4060

0.4493

0.9035

Inflation Rate

0.0423

0.0132

3.1967

Regulation

0.3761

1.0777

0.3490

-0.3080

1.1381

-0.2706

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468

RULE OF LAW
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Table 2-C: The long run effect of the level of local financial markets development on
GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Commercial-central bank assets
(banking system)

(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.3015)
Coefficients
Intercept

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

-4.5572

3.7665

-1.2099

Commercial-central
bank assets

0.0198

0.0772

-0.4390

0.8406

GOV/GDP

0.7903

0.7898

0.2570

FDI openness
Trade openness

0.0063

0.0113

1.0006

0.4608

0.4446

0.5629

Corruption

0.0435

0.0131

1.0364

Inflation Rate

0.5228

1.1088

3.3105

Regulation

-0.6979

1.0047

0.4715

RULE OF LAW

-1.4306

3.2585

-0.6947

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468

Table 2-D: The long run effect of the level of local financial markets development on
GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Bank credit (banking system)
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.3612)
Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

Intercept

-4.4187

2.3797

-1.8568

Bank credit

-3.0406

1.6294

-1.8660

0.4149

GOV/GDP

0.0356

0.0719

0.4956

FDI openness
Trade openness

1.0494

0.7620

1.3771

0.0101

0.0110

0.9197

Corruption

0.2715

0.4372

0.6210

Inflation Rate

0.0400

0.0127

3.1458

Regulation

0.5075

1.0351

0.4903

RULE OF LAW

0.3097

1.1018

0.2811

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468
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Table 2-E: The long run effect of the level of local financial markets development on
GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Valued trade (stock market)
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.4749)
Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

Intercept

-6.3289

2.0840

-3.0368

Valued trade

-3.0338

1.6989

-1.7857

0.1332

GOV/GDP

0.1015

0.0674

1.5056

FDI openness

0.8659

0.6439

1.3447

19.5002
0.6015

Trade openness

0.0118

0.0115

1.0268

Corruption

0.5613

0.3600

1.5591

Inflation Rate

0.0282

0.0109

2.5808

Regulation

-1.1943

1.1359

-1.0514

RULE OF LAW

-0.7494

0.8912

-0.8408

64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468

Table 2-F: The long run effect of the level of local financial markets development on
GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Valued trade (stock market)
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.4709)
Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

Intercept

-6.4001

2.0958

-3.0537

Capitalization

-1.8963

1.1052

-1.7158

0.3462

GOV/GDP

0.1055

0.0677

1.5576

FDI openness
Trade openness

0.8970

0.6519

1.3759

0.0115

0.0116

0.9942

Corruption

0.6408

0.3561

1.7993

Inflation Rate

0.0259

0.0109

2.3594

Regulation

-1.2531

1.1360

-1.1030

RULE OF LAW

-0.7957

0.8911

-0.8929

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468

36
Table 3-A: The short run effect of the level of local financial markets development
on GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Private sector credit (banking system)
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2300)
Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

Intercept

-4.5543

3.2688

-1.3932

Private sector credit

-3.6905

2.1299

-1.7327

0.4606

GOV/GDP

0.0340

0.0992

0.3428

FDI openness
Trade openness

0.8824

1.0269

0.8592

0.0171

0.0150

1.1386

-0.0558

0.5910

-0.0945

Inflation Rate

0.0328

0.0177

1.8530

Regulation

1.3774

1.4252

0.9664

RULE OF LAW

1.0968

1.5232

0.7200

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468

Corruption

Table 3-B: The short run effect of the level of local financial markets development
on GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Liquid liability of financial system
(banking system)

(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.1644)
Coefficients
Intercept

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

-6.5499

3.7220

-1.7597

Liquid liability of
financial system

0.3225

2.5970

0.1241

0.4584

GOV/GDP

0.0247

0.1040

0.2379

FDI openness
Trade openness

0.7350

1.0713

0.6860

0.0132

0.0157

0.8382

Corruption

0.0908

0.6198

0.1465

Inflation Rate

0.0397

0.0182

2.1772

Regulation

1.3675

1.4865

0.9199

-0.3003

1.5699

-0.1912

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468

RULE OF LAW
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Table 3-C: The short run effect of the level of local financial markets development
on GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Commercial-central bank assets
(banking system)

(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.1667)

Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

Intercept

-4.9620

5.1649

-0.9607

Commercial-central
bank assets

-1.5073

4.4683

-0.3373

0.8405

GOV/GDP

0.0146

0.1059

0.1381

FDI openness
Trade openness

0.7894

1.0830

0.7288

0.0136

0.0155

0.8810

Corruption

0.0765

0.6096

0.1255

Inflation Rate

0.0389

0.0180

2.1608

Regulation

1.4722

1.5205

0.9682

-0.2084

1.3777

-0.1513

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468

RULE OF LAW

Table 3-D: The short run effect of the level of local financial markets development
on GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Bank credit (banking system)
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.1887)
Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

Intercept

-5.2028

3.3669

-1.5452

Bank credit

-2.3806

2.3053

-1.0326

0.4149

GOV/GDP

0.0291

0.1018

0.2864

FDI openness
Trade openness

0.9747

1.0781

0.9040

0.0166

0.0156

1.0637

-0.0713

0.6186

-0.1153

Inflation Rate

0.0363

0.0179

2.0182

Regulation

1.4310

1.4646

0.9770

RULE OF LAW

0.5808

1.5590

0.3725

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468

Corruption
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Table 3-E: The short run effect of the level of local financial markets development
on GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Valued trade (stock market)
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2516)
Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

Intercept

-6.4313

2.8522

-2.2548

Valued trade

-5.0468
0.0740
0.9821
0.0246
0.2178
0.0153
-0.4620
-0.3772

2.3252
0.0923
0.8813
0.0157
0.4927
0.0150
1.5546
1.2198

-2.1704
0.8013
1.1144
1.5636
0.4421
1.0230
-0.2972
-0.3090

GOV/GDP

FDI openness
Trade openness
Corruption
Inflation Rate
Regulation
RULE OF LAW

Mean
0.1332

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468

Table 3-F: The short run effect of the level of local financial markets development
on GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Capitalization (stock market)
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2517)
Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

Intercept

-6.5705

2.8572

-2.2995

Capitalization

-3.2719

1.5067

-2.1715

0.3462

GOV/GDP

0.0806

0.0923

0.8729

FDI openness
Trade openness

1.0516

0.8888

1.1831

0.0249

0.0158

1.5753

Corruption

0.3479

0.4855

0.7166

Inflation Rate

0.0113

0.0149

0.7586

Regulation

-0.5431

1.5488

-0.3506

RULE OF LAW

-0.4393

1.2148

-0.3616

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468
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Table 4-A: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on GDP
growth rate loss due to banking crisis in occurred year— Private sector credit
(banking system)

(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2924)
Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

Intercept

-1.2705

3.7440

-0.3393

Private sector credit

-2.1700

2.4395

-0.8895

0.4606

GOV/GDP

-0.0976

0.1136

-0.8591

2.4134

1.1762

2.0517

0.0325

0.0172

1.8865

-1.0302

0.6770

-1.5218

Inflation Rate

0.0243

0.0202

1.2007

Regulation

2.9466

1.6324

1.8050

RULE OF LAW

1.0016

1.7447

0.5741

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468

FDI openness
Trade openness
Corruption

Table 4-B: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on GDP
growth rate loss due to banking crisis in occurred year— Liquid liability of financial
system (banking system)

(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2764)
Coefficients
Intercept

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

-2.3517

4.1381

-0.5682

0.0594

2.8873

0.0206

0.4584

-0.1037

0.1157

-0.8968

2.3211

1.1911

1.9487

0.0304

0.0175

1.7326

-0.9494

0.6891

-1.3775

Inflation Rate

0.0282

0.0203

1.3928

Regulation

2.9370

1.6527

1.7770

RULE OF LAW

0.2177

1.7454

0.1247

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468

Liquid liability of
financial system
GOV/GDP

FDI openness
Trade openness
Corruption
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Table 4-C: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on GDP
growth rate loss due to banking crisis in occurred year— Commercial-central bank
assets (banking system)

(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2784)
Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

Intercept

-0.9129

5.7424

-0.1589

Commercial-central
bank assets

-1.5487

4.9679

-0.3117

0.8405

GOV/GDP

-0.1127

0.1178

-0.9566

2.3887

1.2042

1.9836

0.0306

0.0172

1.7708

-0.9528

0.6778

-1.4056

Inflation Rate

0.0277

0.0200

1.3854

Regulation

3.0524

1.6906

1.8055

RULE OF LAW

0.2336

1.5317

0.1525

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468

FDI openness
Trade openness
Corruption

Table 4-D: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on GDP
growth rate loss due to banking crisis in occurred year— Bank credit (banking
system)

(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2986)
Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

Intercept

-1.0425

3.7403

-0.2787

Bank credit

-2.6966

2.5610

-1.0529

0.4149

GOV/GDP

-0.0971

0.1131

-0.8589

2.6058

1.1977

2.1755

0.0339

0.0173

1.9554

-1.1205

0.6872

-1.6305

Inflation Rate

0.0247

0.0199

1.2371

Regulation

3.0177

1.6270

1.8547

RULE OF LAW

1.1276

1.7319

0.6510

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468

FDI openness
Trade openness
Corruption
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Table 4-E: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on GDP
growth rate loss due to banking crisis in occurred year— Valued trade (stock market)
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2659)
Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

Intercept

-2.3207

3.2739

-0.7088

Valued trade

-3.9653

2.6690

-1.4857

0.1332

GOV/GDP

-0.0388

0.1060

-0.3663

2.3699

1.0116

2.3426

0.0396

0.0181

2.1913

-0.8430

0.5655

-1.4905

Inflation Rate

0.0071

0.0172

0.4126

Regulation

1.0974

1.7844

0.6149

-0.0040

1.4001

-0.0029

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468

FDI openness
Trade openness
Corruption

RULE OF LAW

Table 4-F: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on GDP
growth rate loss due to banking crisis in occurred year— Capitalization (stock market)
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2510)
Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

Mean

Intercept

-2.3646

3.3130

-0.7137

Capitalization

-2.2002

1.7471

-1.2593

0.3462

GOV/GDP

-0.0339

0.1070

-0.3175

2.3687

1.0306

2.2983

0.0374

0.0183

2.0388

-0.7338

0.5630

-1.3034

Inflation Rate

0.0041

0.0173

0.2402

Regulation

0.9802

1.7959

0.5458

-0.1002

1.4086

-0.0711

19.5002
0.6015
64.3827
3.9527
22.7901
0.3134
0.0468

FDI openness
Trade openness
Corruption

RULE OF LAW
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Table 5: The correlation of the indicators of local financial markets
Liquid
liability of Commercial- Private
financial central bank sector
assets
credit
system
Liquid liability of
financial system
1
Commercial-central
bank assets
0.210396
Private sector credit 0.766677
Bank credit
0.84968
Valued trade
0.477458
Capitalization

0.576834

Bank
credit

1
0.445054
1
0.428391 0.929122
1
0.259335 0.551607 0.584144
0.35168

Valued
trade Capitalization

1

0.62997 0.680084 0.941845

1

Table 6:
INDONESIA

COLOMBIA

RUSSIA

UK

-2.01

-2.54

-3.47

FRANCE

-1.44

-1.94

-2.87

JAPAN

-3.03

-4.53

-5.45

This is the report of the change in GDP growth rate decline for the long run when Private sector credit
(PRIVCR) changes by the difference between two countries’ PRIVCR. For example, the difference
between UK’s PRIVCR (1.1158) and Indonesia’s PRIVCR (0.5120) is 0.6038, so the change in GDP
growth rate decline for the long run for these two countries is 0.6038* -3.337=-2.01
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